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This paper introduces my concept of cognitive equivalence (cf. Mandelblit, 1997), an 
attempt to reconcile elements of Nida’s dynamic equivalence with recent innovations in 
cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, and building on the current focus on 
translators’ mental processes in translation studies (see e.g. Göpferich et al., 2009, 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2010; Halverson, 2014). My approach shares its general 
impetus with Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s concept of re-conceptualization, but is 
independently derived from findings in cognitive linguistics and simulation theory (see e.g. 
Langacker, 2008; Feldman, 2006; Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004). Against this background, 
I propose a model of translation processing focused on the internal simulation of reader 
reception and the calibration of these simulations to achieve similarity between ST and TT 
impact. 
The concept of cognitive equivalence is exemplarily tested by exploring a conceptual 
/ lexical field (MALE BALDNESS) through the way that English, German and Japanese 
lexical items in this field are linked to matching visual-conceptual representations by 
native speaker informants. The visual data gathered via this empirical method can be used 
to effectively triangulate the linguistic items involved, enabling an extra-linguistic 
comparison across languages. Results show that there is a reassuring level of inter-
informant agreement within languages, but that the conceptual domain for BALDNESS is 
linguistically structured in systematically different ways across languages. The findings are 
interpreted as strengthening the call for a cognition-focused, embodied approach to 
translation. 
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In a context such as the present one, it is probably not necessary to spell out an 
argument for the continued importance of a debate on the nature of equivalence 
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in translation studies. I will nonetheless devote part of this chapter to this 
endeavour, as I feel that my concern with this topic is far from a consensus in the 
field of translation studies at large and that those with a continued or renewed 
interest in it – such as scholars working from a cognitive or comparative 
perspective – are still a minority. Personally, I believe that a thorough revision of 
what we mean by equivalence and how we envision its role in the process 
leading from source texts (STs) to target texts (TTs) is a necessary stepping 
stone for translation studies as a whole to advance. Furthermore, I am convinced 
that adopting a psychological, cognitive perspective on the issue at hand is the 
right way to proceed, which is why I propose the concept of cognitive 
equivalence (borrowing the term from Mandelblit 1997) as a novel way of 
looking at equivalence in the context of translation theory. A thorough 
explanation of what I mean by this and how this concept can be empirically 
substantiated will be central to the present chapter. 
 
 
2. The demise of equivalence? 
 
As a look into virtually any textbook on translation studies will show, 
equivalence can look back on an impressive but rocky career as a major 
theoretical concept in the field. It is one of the central issues in traditional 
translation studies, in early forms dating back all the way to antiquity, but 
assuming its modern role in the context of a scientific discipline over the course 
of the last century, prominently marked by Vinay and Darbelnet’s use of 
équivalence in 1958 (see Pym, 2010: 8). As an assumed link existing between 
ST and TT – the specific nature of which varies from theory to theory – it played 
an important role as a criterion for defining translation, as well as a promising 
basis for translation quality assessment (see Pym 2010 for a detailed overview). 
Despite this pivotal role, the concept has fallen from favour over the following 
decades, either regarded as an aspect of minor importance to translation theory 
(e.g. in Skopos theory, see Reiss and Vermeer, 1984) or as a concept that is 
considered ill-defined or entirely vacuous and that has so far failed to advance 
translation studies at large (see Snell-Hornby, 1988). Although many of these 
developments can be traced back to sociological or ideological changes in the 
field (cf. the various “turns” of translation studies), there appears to be a real 
problem with traditional theories of equivalence that justifies a sceptical view, as 
I will argue in the following. 
Most theories of translation equivalence tend towards a bipolar view of 
equivalence, namely a (complementary) focus on either the ST or the TT side of 
the equation. This general principle can be found in Schleiermacher’s classic 
model distinguishing between verfremdend (foreignising) and verdeutschend 
(domesticating) translation types (Schleiermacher, 1813), and it has been 
reintroduced under various names in modern translation theory, e.g. in concepts 
put forward by Nida or Newmark, and variations of it in House, Nord, Toury, 
 Aiming for Cognitive Equivalence 215 
 
and Venuti (see Pym, 2010: 31–32). It would be surprising if this structural 
polarity was a mere artefact of scientific description, given that it reflects the 
natural dyad between the two texts involved in the process, as well as the two 
corresponding languages and the respective cultural contexts. If we accept that 
intrinsic differences between the two cultures and languages involved usually 
play a central role in translation, and that furthermore the translator’s task is to 
strategically balance these differences through his1 translation decisions, then 
naturally there is a need to compromise one side or the other in the process. 
Either the translation modulates elements of the source culture as to make them 
more easily understandable to the target culture reader (domestication), or it 
confronts the reader with unfamiliar elements that bring him into closer contact 
with the source culture (foreignisation). The sum of translation decisions made 
in this manner can potentially add up to a clear example of either foreignising or 
domesticating translation, but of course a balanced result as the overall outcome 
is also possible. The overall “style” of translating in turn may or may not 
coincide with an overall translation strategy intentionally chosen by the 
translator, although professionals tend to be aware of such aspects. 
I mention these age-old insights about equivalence as they help to emphasise 
an idea that is central to this volume: Any given pair of languages is 
commensurable only to a certain degree, which entails that the semantic and 
conceptual contents of the source language (SL) material can only be partially 
recreated in the target language (TL). Classic theories of translation, such as the 
one by Vinay and Darbelnet mentioned above, did not generally see this as a 
fundamental problem, as they assumed that natural equivalence relations exist 
independent from any translator’s activities, available as an objective basis to all 
translation decisions. Correspondingly, Vinay and Darbelnet’s work centrally 
revolves around a list of procedures (translated in Pym, 2010: 13) meant as tools 
for translators to re-establish natural equivalence where the linguistic properties 
of language pairs obstruct the transfer of textual material from ST to TT. As 
natural equivalence relations exist a priori and independent of any practical 
translation work, this means that “[t]he individual translator does not really have 
much choice.” (Pym, 2010: 15)  From this perspective, the optimal solution to 
any given translation problem is predetermined – just not always accessible to 
the myopic eyes of a given translator. Translation studies, in turn, is responsible 
for discovering and documenting these natural equivalence relations, thus 
mapping out the problem space of inter-language translation item by item. 
Contemporary theories of equivalence can no longer resort to this view, 
insofar as natural equivalence in the strong sense has been put into question. 
According to Pym, the very core of the concept of natural equivalence needs to 
be critically tested, as one of its problematic entailments is the claim of perfect 
                                                          
1  Use of the male pronoun and other male forms for “translator” are purely a matter of grammar, 
not at all intended to present male translators as normal or ideal (or even prototypical). 
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reciprocity of translation (Pym, 2010: 8). It turned out, however, that removing 
this element from translation theory opened a niche that was immensely difficult 
to fill. Subsequent theories, steering away from a natural equivalence point of 
view, still needed to answer the question “Equivalent to what?”, and their 
answer could no longer rely on pre-existing links between language systems. 
Some frameworks attempted to sidestep the problem by shifting their attention to 
a variety of equivalence types (most famously Koller, 1979), which allows for 
partial equivalence caused by selectively attending to some equivalence 
dimensions rather than others. Other academics reacted more aggressively by 
denouncing the validity of the concept of equivalence altogether, suggesting that 
translation studies should focus on other, more rewarding topics instead (see e.g. 
Snell-Hornby, 1988, Holz-Mättanari, 1990). Still others highlighted the role that 
ideology and imperialistic desires play where the label equivalence is 
deceptively employed (see e.g. Venuti, 1998) or underlined the predominant 
importance of the TT and its functional role as opposed to striving for fidelity 
towards the ST (see e.g. Reiss and Vermeer, 1984). 
None of these alternatives, however, succeeded in finding a suitable 
replacement for the outdated idea of natural equivalence as a basic principle for 
distinguishing translations from any other kind of secondary text. This is more 
than a problem of academic classification, as it entails a fundamental lack of 
certainty about what makes a translation attempt successful, both in the eyes of 
the translator and as judged by others. In my view, this leads translation studies 
into a critical direction, accepting an essentially hermeneutic account of 
translation where the translator as co-author himself determines the criteria by 
which his work can be judged (as argued e.g. by Vermeer, 1994: 13). Even 
assuming that the vast majority of translators have a genuine interest in 
preserving the ST’s message to some degree, following this line of reasoning we 
lose all criteria for differentiating translations from non-translations (cf. the 
discussion in Pym, 1997: 77–78). What is needed is an alternative account of 
translation equivalence that retains the explanatory power of natural equivalence 
without inheriting its questionable aspects, an account that – I would argue – 
will remain elusive unless we take a cognitive perspective on translation. 
 
 
3. Cognitive equivalence as an alternative framework 
 
Only a small group of researchers and theoreticians have attempted to redefine 
equivalence from a cognitive point of view, i.e. primarily concerned with the 
processes inside the minds of agents involved in communicative acts revolving 
around translated texts. When interpreted accordingly, such an account is 
foreshadowed by what House called “response-oriented, behavioral approaches” 
(House, 1997: 4), most centrally in Nida’s famous principle of dynamic 
equivalence (see e.g. Nida, 1964). Important elements of a cognitive perspective 
can also be found in Wilss rendering of translation as a problem-solving process 
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(see, e.g. Wilss, 1990). And whereas a shift towards cognitive linguistics, even a 
“cognitive turn” have been variously discussed over the last two decades2 (see 
e.g. Risku 2000, Halverson 2014), a revised concept of equivalence embedded in 
a comprehensive model of translation has yet to emerge from these endeavours. 
One researcher to explicitly spell out a new type of translation equivalence is 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, whose work on translation as re-conceptualisation 
(see, e.g. 2010) finally offers a novel perspective promising to avoid the 
drawbacks of models based on natural equivalence. Similar to my own approach, 
she adopts concepts and insights from cognitive linguists, specifically Langacker 
and Fauconnier, as a basis for a revised version of equivalence grounded in a 
psychologically realistic account of linguistic and conceptual processing. As 
both the parallels and differences are enlightening, I will briefly summarise 
some central aspects of her model in the following, contrasting her concept of 
re-conceptualisation with my own notion of cognitive equivalence. 
 
3.1. Construal, re-conceptualisation and embodied meaning 
 
From a cognitive perspective, the central question has to be where to situate the 
locus of what we call equivalence, i.e. the theoretical or empirical domain in 
which this phenomenon can allegedly be found. Despite a long tradition in so-
called linguistic theories of translation of identifying equivalence as existing 
between texts (e.g. House, 1997) – a ST in one language and a TT in another as 
the standard scenario – this seems questionable upon closer inspection. 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk accordingly argues that “the main effort in 
translation goes into retaining a similar cognitive effect on the addressee of the 
original and the addressee of the translation” (2015: 23). With this positioning, 
she essentially reformulates Nida and Taber’s classic definition stating that 
“[d]ynamic equivalence is therefore to be defined in terms of the degree to 
which the receptors of the message in the receptor language respond to it in 
substantially the same manner as the receptors in the source language” (Nida and 
Taber, 1969: 24). The focus, however, is slightly different in that Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk is primarily interested in the translator’s efforts in establishing a 
satisfactory degree of equivalence, more so than envisioning an actual 
comparison of ST and TT readers’ cognitive responses. 
In my view this subtle shift is tremendously important, not only because it 
helps deflect criticism that Nida and Taber’s original proposal provoked (see e.g. 
House, 1997: 5), but also because it focuses the discussion on a domain where 
equivalence can be located in a meaningful sense. As I argue elsewhere 
(Sickinger to be published), mental processes in the minds of translators and 
consequent actions informed by them are the only domain in which 
                                                          
2  Complementing research into translation processing based on psycholinguistic methodology – 
see e.g. Krings, 2005, Göpferich et al. 2009 
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considerations of equivalence actually have an impact on the eventual 
constitution of a translated text. Admittedly, other observers may have an 
indirect influence, with TT readers being only marginally influential, translation 
scholars later analysing the material in question even less so. The cognitive 
processes leading to concrete translation decisions, however, are where 
translation studies’ primary interest should lie, as this determines the kind of 
textual material even available for study (as well as TL reception). 
Correspondingly, I think that a contemporary theory of translation needs to be 
centrally informed by a model of translation processing (in this concurring with 
e.g. Krings, 2005 and Göpferich, 2008). Insights gained from textual analyses of 
originals and translations should be treated as a “window into the mind” of the 
translator (in the spirit of Fauconnier, 2000: 96), as this is where constitutive 
decisions about translations are made3. 
If traditional theories of translation equivalence did not even consider this 
point, it is probably because they still entertained an externalist or objectivist 
model of linguistic meaning, i.e. one that axiomatically assigns meaning directly 
to linguistic units, irrespective of human minds processing or memorising them. 
This is one of the first tenets that a newly formed cognitive linguistics set out to 
challenge (see e.g. Lakoff, 1987: 266, cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 79), and the 
role of construal and perspectivity in linguistic meaning has been a central point 
on its agenda ever since (cf. Geeraerts, 2006). Some theories of translation are 
following this lead, emphasising the relative nature of linguistic meaning. 
Similar to Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s claim that “language is not directly 
linked with the extralinguistic world” (2010: 105), I elsewhere argued that 
“(h)uman beings do not interact directly with the world; the interaction is 
mediated by an elaborate network of mental models in human minds.” 
(Sickinger, 2012: 128, footnote omitted) In my own framework, this means that 
“language is an additional functional layer within cognition that can be used to 
organize, activate or navigate conceptual content” (2012: 129). This is in full 
agreement with Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk stating that “(l)exical meanings on 
the other hand are stimulators, which are responsible for concept activation to 
different depth and range.” (2010: 106). A precursor to both positions can be 
found in Langacker’s work, who portrays the semantic value of lexemes as the 
way that they provide selective and preferential access to domains of world 
knowledge, an approach that he calls “encyclopedic semantics” (Langacker, 
2008: 39). 
Applied to the question of translation equivalence, this position entails that 
there is no simple, mechanistic way of transferring meaning from ST to TT, 
given that there is no fixed, stable meaning to begin with. According to 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, “(o)n each occasion meanings of linguistic units 
                                                          
3  This, of course, entails that contextual factors influencing the mental states of translators are 
valid objects of study, too, including translator training and the study of translation workspace 
environments and technology (see e.g. Risku and Windhager 2015). 
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(…) are individually re-created and negotiated among the participants of the 
communicative act.” (2010: 107, footnote omitted) While this might appear to be 
a radical claim, it follows naturally once we accept that linguistic input merely 
provides cues that recipients have to use as a basis for their own interpretative 
conceptualisations4  (instructions in Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s terminology, 
see 2010: 106). 
There is no basis for natural equivalence in such a view on translation, of 
course. If anything, the question needs to be answered how any degree of 
accordance between individual acts of reception can be possible under these 
conditions, an assumption without which translation becomes a virtually 
pointless endeavour. Luckily, in as much as a cognitive perspective introduces a 
relativist element into translation theory, it also provides a solution to the threat 
of communicative solipsism. Agreeing with Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk on this 
matter, I appeal to shared extra-linguistic, embodied experience as a guarantor 
for a sufficient degree of homogeneity between individuals to generally ensure 
communicative success, both in translation and other types of communicative 
interaction. Inspired by Jerome Feldman’s account of embodied meaning, I call 
this the tip of the shared iceberg argument, which is elegantly put by Feldman as 
follows: 
 
Each of us has rich experience with our bodily actions and perceptions, but we can say 
only a very restricted set of things about them. Since speakers and listeners share both the 
experience and the frame parameters, however, a word or expression can convey a great 
deal of meaning. (2006: 147) 
 
In this view, the linguistic layer of communication can have an extremely low 
information density, counterbalanced by the fact that it enables access to vast 
and quite detailed domains of encyclopaedic knowledge 5 . Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk, too, invokes cognitive linguistic theories of meaning to explain 
how translation can function under these conditions, when she states that such 
theories “reach to the level of common prelinguistic structures (Lakoff, 1987) to 
guarantee tertium comparationis of language commensurability, understanding 
and, consequently, translation.” (2015: 16)  
I find that this line of argument, incidentally, relates back to a – often 
discredited – theory of interpreting, namely the so-called theory of sense 
associated with French theorist Danica Seleskovitch (see Seleskovitch and 
Lederer, 1989). In Seleskovitch’s terminology, sense is what emerges from ST 
reception and what is expressed anew in TL, ideally in total disregard of the 
                                                          
4  Cf. the role that inference has in re-creating speaker meaning in relevance theory (e.g. Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986). 
5  Terence Deacon describes this relation as follows: “[t]he way that language represents objects, 
events, and relationships provides a uniquely powerful economy of reference.” (Deacon, 
1997: 22)   
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original SL formulation (cf. Pym, 2010: 19). It is the extra-linguistic element 
that indirectly links ST and TT, and only on this level can equivalence be created 
and assessed. What Seleskovitch rather diffusely described as sense becomes 
substantiated in theories and empirical findings put forward in cognitive 
linguistics and the cognitive sciences, including those mentioned above. And 
whereas the link between translation theory and cognitive science thus 
introduced might appear coincidental, in my view it is the only way to make 
sense of the fact that interlingual translation is evidently possible, without a need 
to resort to natural equivalence or objectivist accounts of linguistic meaning. 
 
3.2. The role of perceptual simulation in language processing 
 
To arrive at a convincing description of the translation process in cognitive 
terms, another element has to be introduced, one that is central to my own 
framework and that in my opinion complements Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s 
thinking about translation. It is well captured in another quote from Jerome 
Feldman, despite the fact that Feldman himself is not a major proponent of the 
respective field of research: “language primarily operates at the level of frame 
parameters and understanding involves imaginative simulation invoked by these 
frames.” (Feldman, 2006: 147) I consider what Feldman calls imaginative 
simulation (mental or perceptual simulation in my own terminology) a crucial 
concept that elegantly links insights from the cognitive sciences, psychology, 
neuroscience and linguistics. The way that I understand mental simulation – and 
correspondingly employ it in a model of translation processing – is centrally 
informed by two sources, namely perceptual symbol systems theory by 
Lawrence Barsalou and simulation semantics as developed by Zwaan and 
Bergen, among others. For the sake of brevity, I will only sketch their 
contributions below and then focus on the way mental simulation can be used to 
explain crucial aspects of the translation process, including equivalence in a 
cognitivist sense. 
The basic idea of mental simulation is laid out and thoroughly described in 
Barsalou’s seminal 1999 paper “Perceptual Symbol Systems”. It offers a 
procedural account of human minds establishing, reactivating, and creatively 
utilising conceptual knowledge, based on contemporary findings in neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology. The entire framework is explicitly grounded in the 
sense of “embodied cognition” (see e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), in that it 
rejects “the standard view that amodal symbols represent knowledge in semantic 
memory.” (Barsalou, 2008: 618) Barsalou defines simulation as follows: 
“[s]imulation is the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states 
acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind.” (Barsalou, 2008: 
618) Experience with the outside world usually involves more than one sensory 
modality, so the ongoing experience is mentally represented via its neural 
activation pattern distributed (but coordinated) across several modal areas of the 
brain. This distributed neural activity is captured in “conjunctive neurons in 
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association areas […] for later representational use.” (Barsalou, 2009: 1281) 
Memory, the mental retrieval of past experience, is constituted by reactivations 
of the neural activity correlated with the original experience. According to 
Barsalou, this representational system on its own is capable of implementing a 
variety of cognitive processes, “including high level perception, implicit 
memory, working memory, long-term memory, and conceptual knowledge.” 
(Barsalou, 2008: 622) 
The role of language in this framework is that of (re-)activating such neural 
activation patterns, which – on a functional level – Barsalou labelled simulators 
(cf. the similar role of ICMs in Lakoff, 1987, mental models in Johnson-Laird, 
1983 and frames in Fillmore, 1985). Conceptual activity, whether triggered by 
linguistic input or otherwise, is the dynamic generation of simulations by 
simulators that cover the relevant conceptual domains (Barsalou, 2009: 1282). 
Simulations are generated in specific situations to achieve relevant cognitive 
goals, i.e. their activity is highly context-dependent. This is a natural source of 
dynamic variability of both conceptual contents and linguistic meaning, and it 
perfectly matches Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s idea of re-conceptualisation: 
Every instance of a simulation produced is, in effect, a re-conceptualisation in 
that it dynamically re-creates the original meaning in a contextually modulated 
fashion. 
The focus in Barsalou’s work is on cognition in general, not specifically on 
language or the linguistic-conceptual interface, which he only discusses 
occasionally (but see Barsalou et al. 2008). However, a dedicated theory of 
simulation in language processing has been developed under the name 
simulation semantics. One of its proponents, Benjamin Bergen, describes the 
central tenet of the approach as follows: 
 
(…) understanding a piece of language is hypothesized to entail performing mental 
perceptual and motor simulations of its content (…). This implies that the meanings of 
words and of their grammatical configurations are precisely the contributions those 
linguistic elements make to the construction of mental simulations. (Bergen, 2007: 278) 
 
This account has obvious similarities with what is usually called mental 
imagery, but whereas mental imagery is mostly portrayed as a conscious and 
optional cognitive process (cf. Barsalou, 2008: 619), proponents of simulation 
semantics such as Bergen stress that all linguistic meaning lies in the activation 
of mental simulations. Rolf Zwaan, maybe the most influential researcher 
originally involved in simulation semantics, in his framework stresses the role of 
the “immersed experiencer” (Zwaan, 2004), i.e. a focal entity whose perspective 
is taken in the simulation process, with perceptual and interactional features of 
other elements in the simulation directly dependent on their position relative to 
the focal entity (2004: 43). This position aligns perfectly with Barsalou’s claim 
that conceptual processing and representation (i.e. perceptual simulation) are 
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always situated (see e.g. Barsalou 2002). When activating one specific concept 
in their mind, what cognisers do is to “construct a multimodal simulation of 
themselves interacting with an instance of the concept.” (2002: 9) 
The models put forward in simulation semantics generally deal with language 
perception, which means that on their own, they cannot explain the entirety of 
processes involved in acts of translation (which obviously also include the 
creation of a TT, i.e. language production). I think it is safe to assume, however, 
that the same principle of linguistic-conceptual interaction can be applied to 
production processes: If linguistic input is interpreted by means of the activation 
of simulators, then simulator activity is also the conceptual substrate to language 
production. Barsalou briefly comments on this extension of simulation 
semantics, claiming that if we accept the simulation view of linguistic meaning 
then “examining a simulation and categorizing its components would be central 
to the process of language production.” (Barsalou, 2012: 241) The linguistic 
output in question is derived from preceding (or simultaneous) simulator 
activity, in the sense that the “simulation activates associated words, which are 
produced in utterances to describe the simulation.” (2012: 241) 
 
3.3. The role of cognitive equivalence and mental simulation in translation 
 
To conclude this part of the present chapter, let me tie all these strands together 
by presenting an abridged version of the model of translation processing put 
forward in the context of my PhD thesis. In my view, the central problem in 
translation is ultimately one of decision making (cf. Wilss, 1990 on this 
perspective), more specifically of selecting exactly one TL formulation to 
replace a corresponding SL formulation out of a large, potentially infinite, 
number of options available. The genesis of a (successful) translation can be 
directly linked to such decision making processes, and a better understanding of 
their procedural nature would surely be a valuable asset to translation studies. 
Whereas translation process research provides a variety of answers to this 
question (see e.g. Krings, 2005, Göpferich et al. 2009), these answers are 
situated on the level of operations carried out by the translator, either externally 
observable or introspectively available to the translator himself (and thus 
recordable in the form of “verbal-report data”, cf. Krings, 2005). I am much 
more interested in the basal mechanisms behind linguistic decision making that 
underlie all translation processing, specifically comprising the parts not 
consciously accessible to translators. This is what Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 
refers to when she states that for re-conceptualisation operations, the “label 
‘strategies’ would not always be particularly adequate, as it implies a conscious 
act on the part of the translator” (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2010: 141). 
My proposal for how translators are able to perform the impressive feat of 
deciding on TT formulations relies on the premises described above: Conceptual 
meaning is embodied, realised in perceptual simulations that are dynamically 
created each time a concept is activated, and linguistic units acquire their 
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respective meaning by activating in a specific manner a simulator representing a 
conceptual entity or domain. From such a cognitive perspective, then, what 
exactly happens in the mind of a translator during translation processing? 
Building on the framework laid out in simulation semantics, the first step is 
fairly straightforward: As a recipient of the ST, the translator actualises (or re-
conceptualises, pace Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk) the meaning encoded in the 
linguistic surface of the ST in the form of a mental simulation. Here, obviously, 
different translators can arrive at different simulations based on the same ST, at 
least diverging in detail – depending on the level of vagueness inherent to the 
text and the differences in cognitive background between the translators in 
question. This type of variation seems quite natural to assume if we take into 
account the important role of construal and inference in interpreting linguistic 
input (again, see Geeraerts, 2006, Sperber and Wilson, 1986). I assume that the 
simulation resulting from ST reception is no longer bound to linguistic form or 
structure, i.e. that it is realised entirely within the conceptual system6. This is 
where a tertium comparationis for translation purposes can be found, 
reminiscent of Seleskovitch’s notion of sense (Seleskovitch and Lederer 1989). 
The basic process is depicted in figure 1 below, with “SimTr:ST” standing for a 
mental simulation of the ST meaning as understood by the translator (Tr). 
 
 
Figure 1. Phase one of the translation process 
 
In the next step, this conceptual representation (i.e. active simulation) is used as 
an associative basis for activating matching TL formulations, similar to what 
Barsalou describes as simulations activating “associated words, which are 
produced in utterances to describe the simulation.” (Barsalou, 2012: 241) Note, 
however, that this most likely only pertains to what is often called free 
translation. There is nothing speaking against employing a dual-route structure 
for this part of the process, with SL linguistic forms either priming or directly 
activating TL forms associated with them strictly on the linguistic level7. This is 
                                                          
6  Although it is safe to assume that the corresponding linguistic form remains in memory at least 
for a short amount of time, potentially available to activate the simulation anew (cf. the 
corresponding research in psycholinguistics, e.g. Lombardi and Potter 1992). 
7  This is the processing route that Barsalou et al. (2008) emphasise in their LASS model, 
although I am very sceptical if purely linguistic co-activation plays a significant role outside 
laboratory experiments and, potentially, early phases of language acquisition. 
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probably the case where SL technical terms have a designated counterpart in the 
TL (terms with “standard equivalents” in Wilss’ [1990: 29] terminology). It also 
applies to cases of word-by-word translation, with a continuum connecting this 
type of translation and maximally free translation at the other end, describable 
within the terms of my model as a bias towards one of the two routes available 
for generating TL formulations (see figure 2 below). 
 
 
Figure 2. Phase two of the translation process  
 
This, incidentally, is where my version of a cognitive account of the translation 
process subtly diverges from the one offered by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk. 
She assumes that, generally, 
 
(…) what translators do is transduce the mental SL model they develop on hearing or 
reading a SL text into one in the TL, which they consider most suitable to the TL audience 
and, at the same time, most faithful to the original, intended meaning of the message. 
(2010: 108) 
 
On my account, as mentioned above, the model is derived from the ST, but is 
independent from it in the sense that it is no longer bound to the SL surface 
form. I would also not expect translators to mentally entertain two versions of 
the meaning derived from the ST, i.e. generate a copy of the ST-triggered 
conceptual activity only for the purpose of activating corresponding TT 
formulations. Rather, the simulation exists in between the two languages, 
functioning as a tertium comparationis that allows for bridging the gap between 
two languages in the first place (abstractly depicted in figure 2 above). This 
should be true whether we discuss this phenomenon in terms of mental events 
and representations or in terms of their physical instantiation in brain structures 
and neural activity patterns. From a mentalist point of view, the mode of 
thinking that crucially enables translation between two languages is a non-
linguistic type of mental activity procedurally linking two linguistic mental 
actions. Correspondingly, on the physical level specific areas of the brain that 
can be functionally differentiated from others are responsible for this part of the 
process as opposed to its linguistic aspects. Following Barsalou (1999, 2009), 
these are assumed to be associative networks of neurons directly linked to or 
engaged in perception, introspection and motor activity. The neural connections 
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between areas concerned with conceptual simulation and the brain areas 
responsible for language processing in SL and TL are the physical correlate of 
the sense relation that connects linguistic expressions in translation or 
interpreting (cf. Seleskovitch and Lederer, 1989). 
If language-specific modifications to the mental simulation occur, I propose, 
it is likely due to actively employed translation strategies, e.g. after detecting 
culture-specific concepts and attempting to lessen their impact on the 
intelligibility of the TT. Even in these cases, I expect that the automatic process 
of generating TL formulations associated with the mental simulation will 
immediately commence, with strategic interventions by the translator occurring 
as reactions to disruptions of automatic, non-conscious processing, i.e. cases 
where associative links do not co-activate any viable counterpart in the TL. This 
mismatch in turn alerts the system and attracts attention, including executive 
control and potentially conscious deliberation in the process, which necessarily 
entails additional processing cycles and therefore takes place on a notably larger 
time scale (tens of seconds to minutes, rather than a few seconds or less). 
The above account outlines a – psychologically realistic – mechanism for 
deriving translation options, but it still leaves open the question of how 
translators select one of these options with the (ideally adequate) feeling that the 
option chosen is a valid way of translating the ST. The ability to do so – at more 
than chance level – is central to what we call translation competence, alongside 
the linguistic and cultural knowledge necessary to generate viable TL 
formulations in the first place. As for the mechanism implementing this 
competence, I suggest that this, too, is based on simulation, although in a slightly 
different sense. More precisely, I posit that translation decisions are based on the 
internal simulation of the effect of a prospective formulation on an imagined 
recipient – roughly in the spirit of Nida and Taber (1969). Based on the 
simulation created in phase one (see figure 1 above), a derivative simulation is 
created that represents the cognitive impact of the ST on SL recipients as 
imagined by the translator. This simulation (SimR:ST), in the simplest possible 
case, can be fully identical to the translator’s own simulation (SimTr:ST), 
although it is very likely that seasoned translators automatically assume a more 
“naïve” perspective here, using a mechanism that in simulation theory is called 
quarantine (see Goldman, 2006). The process of evaluating recipient reactions 
based on simulation most likely employs a theory of mind routine normally used 
for what is known as mindreading (Goldman, 2006: 3). Concurrently, a mental 
simulation of the first TL formulation generated is created based on input from 
the TL linguistic system (without this formulation having been externally 
produced yet), plus a derived simulation representing the reception of TT 
recipients based on it. As the process is fairly complex, it might help to refer to 
the diagram in figure 3 below.  
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Figure 3. Phase three of the translation process  
 
The outcome of this procedure is a simulation of the ST meaning and a – more 
or less corresponding – simulation of the TT translation attempt currently 
entertained. These two simulations are now available for internal comparison, 
resulting in a measure of similarity (or divergence, respectively). This 
comparison of TT simulation with ST simulation is where I posit that translation 
equivalence can be found – notably on the conceptual level, not between the SL 
and TL linguistic system. In my own terminology, the simulations are being 
compared for assessing cognitive equivalence, which I define as follows8: 
 
Cognitive equivalence is the (temporary) result of a comparative cognitive process 
involving two texts9 and their respective reception, simulated in the minds of translators 
during translation activity. Its role is centrally that of an evaluative criterion which directly 
guides decision making processes in translation work. 
 
There are several options how this process could play out in real-time, either 
sequentially as a series of consecutively modulated attempts, or – more 
realistically given the massively parallel nature of human cognition in general – 
simultaneously in a kind of horse race, in which several TL options are 
competing and the one achieving the highest level of cognitive equivalence will 
be initially chosen. This last part of the process, at least temporarily completing 
the cognitive task at hand by producing the formulation thus selected (TL form 
X), is displayed in figure 4 below.  
                                                          
8  Note that there are discernible parallels with Nili Mandelblit’s “cognitive translation 
hypothesis” (1996: 486), and that the specific term “cognitive equivalence” furthermore 
appears in Al-Hasnawi (2007) and Taheri-Ardali et al. (2013). 
9  One of the texts at this stage only exists as a translation attempt mentally entertained by the 
translator that, in case of revision due to perceived lack of cognitive equivalence, may never be 
physically realised elsewhere. 
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Figure 4. Phase four of the translation process  
 
Interestingly, I find parallels between my own account and the concept of 
translation as a Third Space proposed by Juliane House (2008). House 
formulates her own perspective as follows: 
 
 (…) the realization of a discourse out of a text available in writing then involves 
imaginary, hidden interaction between writer and reader in the mind of translator, where 
the natural unity of speaker and listener in oral interaction must be imagined in the face of 
the real-world separateness in space and time of writer and reader (2008: 156) 
 
In her description, the translator’s task is to recontextualise the ST in an 
encounter with the target language and culture, creating a kind of virtual context 
during translation activity. In this sense, “context in translation is not dynamic” 
as it would be in dyadic interaction “as it solely and simply emerges from the 
translator’s creatively imagining a virtual context – which is neither here nor 
there but in Third Space.” (House, 2008: 156) Note the similarities to the 
position taken by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk when she states that “translation 
involves a number of cycles of re-conceptualization of an original SL message, 
expressed eventually in the TL.” (2010: 107) She further elaborates that the SL 
original as received is then 
 
 (…) mediated by translators, who, inspired both by the author and by their own perception 
of the SL audience, re-create, according to their own conceptualization model, a TL 
version in a new TL context. (2010: 144) 
 
My own addition to the theoretical debate is the mechanism and procedural 
model briefly described above, spelling out in some detail what this ability of 
translators is based on and how a revised concept of equivalence can be 
embedded in a cognitive theory of translation. In the final section of this chapter, 
I will address the question how to empirically assess the viability of the 
cognitive perspective on translation and linguistic meaning adopted here. 
228 Pawel Sickinger 
 
4.  BALDNESS across languages – an attempt at making mental models 
observable 
 
Another claim formulated by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk is that “(t)he degree of 
equivalence between SL and TL structures can thus be measured in terms of the 
reference categories mentioned” (2015: 54), referring to a number of concepts 
adopted from cognitive linguistics such as prototypicality and construal. The 
proposal that equivalence can be measured, of course, leaves open the question 
of how this could be undertaken, both in theoretical and in practical terms. 
Unless there is at least one successful demonstration of such measuring, 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s claim can easily be rejected as a thought 
experiment without relevant implications for translation research or practice. 
Indeed, this is one of the lines of criticism that Nida and Taber’s model of 
dynamic equivalence was originally subjected to (see e.g. House, 1997). 
The methodological problem in question turns out to be an intricate one. The 
general inaccessibility of mental phenomena (cf. Fauconnier, 2000) makes it not 
merely impractical to take such measurements, but rather calls for a proof-of-
concept demonstrating that it is possible in principle. The empirical study 
reported below is an attempt at such a measuring procedure, with the explicit 
aim of making equivalence relations of the kind referred to by Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk not only visible, but quantifiable for explicit comparison across 
languages. Naturally, such a precarious endeavour has to be pursued under 
controlled conditions, initially examining a test case that does not necessarily 
capture the complexity of all imaginable real-life scenarios. Such a controlled 
procedure is necessary not only to ensure the undertaking is manageable, but 
also to isolate the relevant factors at work without confounding them. In the case 
at hand, I wanted to test whether the organisation of conceptual material as it is 
linked to linguistic expressions can be made observable in a laboratory 
experiment revolving around visual material created by informants. This meant I 
had to focus on a concept that has a strong visual core, and that furthermore can 
be assumed to exist in very similar form across the cultural backgrounds of 
informants involved in the study. I opted for the concept (or mental model) of 
MALE BALDNESS in its most basic sense, i.e. the phenomenon of natural loss 
of hair on the head of male individuals over the course of their lives and, more 
specifically, the visible effects of this process. 
In line with the model of conceptual meaning described above, I posit that 
every (adult) human being has mental access to a simulator concerned with 
various states and forms of male hair loss, based on previous sensory experience 
with the phenomenon (i.e. a perceptual symbol in the sense of Barsalou, 1999). 
This simulation is called upon when such states of baldness are necessary for 
internal processing – e.g. when remembering the appearance of a balding 
acquaintance – or, more importantly in this context, when triggered by linguistic 
input referring to BALDNESS. As described in simulation semantics (see e.g. 
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Bergen, 2007), the meaning of such linguistic input lies in the way it activates a 
corresponding simulator in a specific manner, as discussed in section 3.2.  
The premise of my study, accordingly, was that upon reading a sentence such 
as “He has a bald pate.”, informants would mentally create a simulation of the 
appearance of such a person based on visual data in their long-term memory. I 
operationalised this in a methodological setup that is an inversion of William 
Labov’s famous cup experiment (Labov, 1973) and also builds on more recent 
work in semasiological and onomasiological studies carried out by Geeraerts and 
colleagues (Geeraerts et al., 1994). In contrast to Labov who had informants 
name drawings of cup-like containers, I presented linguistic stimuli such as the 
sentence above to informants and asked them to create a visual representation 
best matching the sentence’s meaning. 
To achieve experimental rigor and comparability between informants, these 
representations could not be pencil drawings or other free forms of depiction. 
Rather, the generation of visual material took place in a virtual online 
environment specifically created for this study. Informants basically manipulated 
two slide controllers that modulated the distribution and amount of hair on the 
depiction of a male figure’s head. As to make the model as neutral and at the 
same time as naturalistic as possible, the effects of this visual manipulation are 
based on an established chart used for medicinal diagnosis, the so-called 
Norwood-Hamilton scale (Norwood, 1975). The study was distributed online, 
with 232 native speakers of German, 168 native speakers of American English 
and 169 native speakers of Japanese participating. A screenshot of the 




Figure 5. The experimental program used to study the mental model for BALDNESS 
230 Pawel Sickinger 
 
This method was intended to provide insights into ordinary language users’ 
conceptual representation of MALE BALDNESS and the way that specific sub-
regions of it are selectively activated by what I call baldness terms. More 
specifically, I was interested in the internal structure of the conceptual category 
and its linguistic activation routes compared between English, German and 
Japanese, all of which have their respective means of referencing baldness 
phenomena via a language-specific inventory of baldness terms. A collection of 
these terms had been previously gathered in interviews conducted with native 
speakers of all three languages. The concrete aim of the study was to capture the 
conceptual activation routes for a given language’s baldness terms in a non-
linguistic format, resulting in a “mental map” for the concept that, due to its 
independence from linguistic description, can be validly compared across 
languages. 
For the purpose of quantitative comparison, the resulting visual material had 
to be transformed into a numerical format, with values based on underlying 
visual features. The result is one data point located in a two-dimensional metric 
space for each visualisation created by an informant. More precisely, the two 
dimensions represent state changes along two feature dimensions also derived 
from the Norwood-Hamilton scale, namely a specific pattern of hair loss 
occurring in the frontotemporal area of the scalp and on the vertex, respectively. 
The resulting numerical data is of the interval type, which means that the degree 
of difference (or similarity) between data points can be measured in terms of 
their Euclidian distance within the metric space. This makes it possible to 
quantify the degree of visual difference between any pair of visualisations – the 
further away they are located within the model’s matrix, the less similar their 
appearance. Applied to a large number of results, this enables an assessment of 
how homogenous the native speakers of a given language are in terms of their 
mental representations of the baldness term in question, e.g. “bald spot” or 
“widow’s peak”. Treating each data point as a prototypical representation of the 
term in question according to one informant, it was possible to derive aggregate 
prototypes averaging over the entire population tested in the respective language 
(the centroid of one such category). An exemplary result is shown in figure 6 
below, namely the summary of the experimental data gathered for the baldness 
term “bald patch” in the American English data set.  
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Figure 6. Data obtained for the baldness term “bald patch” 
 
This method of describing the data might not appear to be specifically 
enlightening in its own right, but it becomes highly informative once compared 
with other baldness terms from the same language, or with baldness terms in 
other languages. The main virtue of the approach, after all, is that results 
obtained in one language are directly comparable with experimental data from 
another language, as all use the same underlying visual model10. Using this 
method, it is possible to determine the degree of conceptual similarity between 
e.g. the American English “bald pate” and the German “Kahlkopf” by 
determining the relative size of overlap between the two categories and the 
distance between their respective centroids. This way closest equivalents (within 
the limitations of the concept selected and the experimental model used) 
between languages can be determined experimentally, based on a quantiative 
measure of their respective goodness of fit. 
Unfortunately, the overall findings are very complex and difficult to convey 
in a condensed format, making it impossible to reproduce them here. E.g. the 
sheer number of baldness terms tested – 15 to 16 per language, a total of 46 – 
and the correspondingly huge number of potential comparisons between terms 
makes it difficult to adequately summarise the outcome. As an exemplary insight 
into the results, however, a diagram displaying the relative position of the 
centroids for all baldness terms tested in American English can be found in 
figure 7 below. Furthermore, two selected comparisons across languages are 
reproduced in table 1 and 2 beneath. “lichter werden” (BT GER 12) is a good 
example for a conceptual near-synonym across languages, as in addition to an 
almost identical centroid position, it also has a category overlap of almost 80 
percent with “hair is thinning out” (BT USA 10), as visible in table 1. Similarly, 
“receding hairline” (BT USA 06) is the closest available equivalent for both 
                                                          
10  Which, again, is presumed to be universally valid across languages, a premise that was 
generally confirmed by pilot study informants and during the interviews. 
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“hohe Stirn” (BT GER 06) and “Geheimratsecken” (BT GER 04), although 
closely followed by other English terms such as “widow’s peak” (see table 2). 
 
 
Figure 7. Centroids for American English baldness terms tested 
 
Table 1. Near-synonyms between German and American English data (excerpt 1) 
 
Baldness term GER  
 
Centroid distance  Best equivalent baldness 
terms USA  
BT GER 12: lichter werden  1.63  BT USA 10: hair is 
thinning out  
 
BT GER 14: sein Haar 
verlieren  
2.49  
BT GER 13: schütteres Haar  6.48  
 
Table 2. Near-synonyms between German and American English data (excerpt 2) 
 
Baldness term USA  
 
Centroid distance  Best equivalent baldness 
terms GER 
BT USA 06: receding hairline  0.9  BT GER 06: Hohe Stirn 
2.62 BT GER 04: 
Geheimratsecken  
  




As the brief extract from my study on conceptual meaning across languages 
shows, it is possible to systematically investigate the relations between linguistic 
units (signifiers, as it were) and the conceptual activity that instantiates their 
meaning in natural languages. This, in turn, can be used to establish equivalence 
relations between terms across languages by measuring the degree of similarity 
between the perceptual simulations activated by their reception. Variation 
between individual language users and – assumedly – within individuals across 
occasions means, of course, that the figures derived from such a procedure are 
only rough predictors, which arguably is not a flaw of the method, but mirrors 
real-life variation and fluidity in meaning. It also needs to be stressed that the 
experimental tool used for this purpose does not easily generalise across 
concepts, in the same way that BALDNESS is not necessarily a representative 
choice for all concepts existing as mental models in human minds (specifically 
as I have disregarded its higher-level cultural implications). Accordingly, the 
method applied here is not meant as a blueprint that can be utilised to compile a 
universal lexicon of conceptual meanings – at least I do not see a feasible and 
ecologically realistic way of implementing it as such at this point. 
Despite these limitations, however, the study serves as a proof-of-concept 
that equivalence of linguistic meaning can be anchored and empirically assessed 
in the domain of conceptual knowledge. In a more general sense, I hope to have 
shown that my notion of cognitive equivalence is a viable proposal for revising 
the traditional concept of equivalence in translation studies. It has noticeable 
parallels with Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk’s re-conceptualisation approach 
(2010), but goes beyond it in that it posits mental simulation based on perceptual 
symbols as the central mechanism enabling cross-linguistic processing. It is 
exactly this level of mental simulation that functions as a tertium comparationis, 
which is necessary to explain the specific competence and corresponding 
activities that characterise the profession of translating. This, I propose, is a solid 
starting point for establishing a cognitive approach to translation, as demanded 
by a number of scholars in the field (see e.g. Risku, 2000, Halverson, 2014), 
potentially contributing to the eventual formation of a cognitive translation 
studies. As even Juliane House now begins to advocate (House, 2015), a shift in 
translation studies that opens it to new perspectives coming from the cognitive 
sciences, psycholinguistics, cognitive and neurolinguistics is necessary to 
prevent the discipline from becoming increasingly self-enclosed and stagnant. 
The model and empirical method proposed here are intended as a step into this 
direction.  
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